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The emergence of phenomena such as fake news, alternative facts, and new wave populism 
have resulted in a new pressing problem for most modern democracies in the Western world. 
They have stressed a conceptual shift within the social tendencies and processes, which has 
resulted in the creation of a post-truth world. The main characteristics of such phenomena 
can be described as the transition from an evidence-based, normative and factual discourse 
to an emotional, post-factual and populistic one. The reason for this can be found in the psy-
chological and technical dimensions of contemporary society. A synthesis of postmodernist 
logic of falling metanarratives, with the spread of social media, altered the nature of the truth 
and the lie. In this context, the changes in European politics at the supranational level became 
particularly important. The threat of populism, which uses the post-truth discourse in its fa-
vour, has forced the EU to elaborate on a set of mechanisms to overcome the negative effects 
of fake news and disinformation. Meanwhile, the main idea of how to tackle the phenomena of 
the post-truth world is based on the principle of societal resilience. An adaptive environment 
towards stressful influence on the Union is nowadays the global aim of the EU and it became 
particularly important right before the 2019 European parliament elections. This research will 
provide an analysis of the preliminary and preparatory measures that had been undertaken by 
the EU and a more general overview of the EU’s capacity to resist post-truth.
Keywords: post-truth, resilience, disinformation, fake news, European Union, European Par-
liament election.
Introduction
The public discourse in most European countries has experienced in recent years a 
major concern on the changing nature of the social and political environment. Starting 
with a new wave of the increasing influence of populist movements in nearly every EU 
country and their informational domination in the media it ended up in the manifestation 
of the creation of a post-truth environment. The year 2016 brought a series of influential 
examples, where political behaviour of different societies has tended to be “emotionally 
motivated” or “irrational” in the sense that it has rejected an evidence-based decision in 
favour of an affective one. The President Trump’s Election and Brexit have served as an 
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impetus for brought discussions on the shift from a factual political environment to a 
post-factual. In a more generalized sense, this means that reasoned decisions were denied, 
despite the possible consequences. The idea of a post-truth world was also promoted by 
the expert community because of the failure of most forecasts signalizing the lack of pre-
dictability in contemporary politics.
Nevertheless, it might be assumed that all the examples of lying and affective influ-
ence are nothing new to politics [1]. But it’s not only about lying. Post-truth does not 
automatically mean rejection of truth and acceptance of lies, but “it refers to the blurring 
distinction between the two” [2, p. 2] or, in other words, it leads to the “liberalisation of 
truth” [2, p. 24]. This liberalisation is partly driven by the deeply inherent “confirmation 
bias”. Thus, emotions have ever served in favour of politicians. But the informatization of 
everyday life and the mediatization of the social sphere made the dissemination of differ-
ent truths or lies even easier. Also, such concepts as “filter bubbles” or “echo chambers” 
signify the yet lacking knowledge about the influence of information technologies and 
modern media (in particular, in the hands of populists and radical political movements, 
but not only).
Despite the all-inclusive character of post-truth, most of the topic related researches 
are based on the two aforementioned examples. This reveals the necessity of a broader 
survey on the post-truth phenomena. Although there is a multitude of examples at the 
national level, this research gives an insight into the supranational or EU-level manifesta-
tions of the post-truth politics and how it is conceptualized in the EU strategies or the 
actions of EU institutions. In doing so, the theory of social resilience developed by such 
authors as P. Bourbeau [3] and D. Chandler [4] is applied to describe the EU’s perception 
of some aspects of the post-truth environment (e.g. fake news, disinformation) and to 
categorize different kinds of countermeasures. Furthermore, the resilience theory gives a 
solid basis for an in-depth analysis of some mistakes in the EU’s understanding of disin-
formation (fake news) as a predominantly external threat, ignoring the complex nature of 
today’s information environment. This research focuses on the European Union because 
of the illustrative nature of the EU’s disinformation campaign right before the 2019 Eu-
ropean Parliament elections, which provides a yet understudied example of an attempt to 
counter some effects of post-truth.
Post-truth. A contested concept?
To introduce the concept of post-truth more definitively it is worth to take a look at 
the definition of this term proposed by Ignas Kalpolas in his “A Political Theory of Post-
Truth”. He gives a broad interpretation of post-truth as “a general condition of detachment 
of truth-claims from verifiable facts and the primacy of criteria other than verifiability in 
the audiences’ decision to affiliate themselves with a particular truth-claim, such claims 
being pitched to audiences as narrative fictions that constitute their own lived realities 
and explain the world” [2, p. 5]. This interpretation of this phenomena gives several im-
portant insights. First of all, by defining post-truth as a “condition” he marks it as a lasting 
environment, that is not attributed to a single political event. Secondly, he does not deny 
the existence of “truth-claims”, but stresses their plurality and the personal wish of an 
individual to affiliate himself with a “truth”. And finally, he points out its non-fact-based 
character, making any “truth-claim” a “narrative fiction” for a target audience. 
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But what are the preconditions of such an environment? The academic and non-ac-
ademic community provides a brought variety of such explanations, ranging from psy-
chological and cultural to political and informational. They all have different degrees of 
persuasiveness. But all together they form the awareness of a shifting environment. Some 
authors even note, that the essential characteristic of post-truth “is the recognition, both 
within the study of these respective fields and within wider public discourse, that emo-
tions matter” [5, p. 419]. All the crucial factors that brought to such recognition are es-
sentially connected to three main topics: media, algorithms (and big data), and distrust. 
The “mediatization” of politics has revealed, that media change our current under-
standing of the social life [6; 7]. They “have become co-constructive for the articulation of 
various social fields in their present form: politics, economics, education, and so on” [8, 
p. 321], thus making the social world nearly disappearing outside the media. The culture 
of “promotionalism” [9] drives politics to a show-like type of content. At the same time, 
alongside the general mediatization of everyday life, there is a process of decentraliza-
tion happening. The appearance of social media gave an impetus to a rising number of 
information sources, thus contesting traditional media. This fragmentation of the media 
environment brought to an even more fragmented society with different groups consum-
ing their “truths” through personalized information flow.
This personalized information flow is mostly enabled through algorithms and data-
based instruments and tools operating on social networks. They show the relevant con-
tent to a proper person, thus making him consume information, that corresponds to his 
sentiments. Furthermore, the “attention economy” [10], “culture of sensationalism and a 
focus on gaining clicks and views” [5, p. 421] fosters a distorted reality, where the content 
is displayed disproportionately [11]. In political circumstances, where personal data is 
collected and analyzed, it “can provide an extremely detailed picture of a person’s life” [12, 
p. 31], thus enabling a situation where “populations corresponding to beliefs and opinions 
are planned, produced, and managed by big data-driven predictive analytics and resource-
rich strategic communication” [10, p. 330].
Distrust became the third powerful engine of post-truth’s spread. It has taken several 
forms. The most obvious one is populism. The popular discontent both with public media 
and governments or other political institutions became a strong motive to seek for an af-
fective perspective on social problems. The fact that people in Western countries became 
attracted by marginalized or disenfranchised movements in the situation of a “declining 
numbers of voters in presidential and parliamentary elections across the West” [13, p. 20] 
demonstrates the spreading distrust. Different events, such as the 2008 financial crisis, the 
Iraq War are responsible for the loss of confidence in any influence on political processes 
[13, p. 21]. In European politics, another example of an event that has fostered a new wave 
of populism can be found in the 2015–2016 migration crisis. The mediatized environment 
accompanied by an acute social problem has utilized the public distrust to spread post-
truth politics, as we currently know it. And so pluralism (that is so essential for a demo-
cratic state) has evolved into political polarization.
Despite all these evidence of post-truth interfering even deeper in the social real-
ity, the post-truth concept itself is sometimes perceived as contested. This is due to the 
“current, largely non-academic wave of anxiety and interest” [14, p. 1105]. Because of its 
initially non-academic manner, the term has been to a large extent politicized and used 
to express different meanings or even serve as a stigma in public debates. Nevertheless, 
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in the academic discourse post-truth serves as an interdisciplinary or umbrella concept 
including a broad range of approaches, connected to psychology, media studies, political 
science, international studies, and even computer science.
But still, there are some assumptions about post-truth existing in the academic dis-
course, that tend to be rather doubtful. One of them brings post-truth in strict connection 
to postmodernism, as a cultural background [15]. “In fact, post-truth is not inspired by 
postmodernism but is, instead, a testament to the insightfulness of at least some of the post-
modernist thinkers who have been able to predict something akin to the post-truth condi-
tion decades” [2], in other words, claiming, that postmodernism has caused post-truth is 
equal to “blaming a diagnosis for having caused the diagnosed condition” [2]. Thus, the “fall 
of metanarratives” is rather an implicit characteristic of the discussed conditions. The same 
goes for the supposedly relativistic nature of post-structuralism. “Post-structuralism is not a 
dogma that demands that we all reject ‘facts’. The point is rather to recognise how particular 
ideas and practices gain the status of ‘facts’ or ‘common sense’ knowledge as a result of the 
way in which they are represented, abstracted or interpreted” [5].
The other rather questionable assumption on post-truth is the oversimplification of 
the concept by connecting it only to the problem of fake news, omitting the general con-
text of distrust and political fragmentation. “Fake news”, together with such notions as 
“alternative facts”, “strategic misinterpretation”, etc., reflect only particular aspects of the 
post-truth environment, or different instruments of post-truth politics. Therefore, while 
analyzing them, it is useful and necessary to keep in mind the cumulative effect of the 
aforementioned forces that drive democratic states across the globe (not only in Western 
states) into a jet unknown direction.
Social resilience and post-truth. Some insights into the resilience theory
The current limits of a broad post-truth theory have a multifaceted nature. Despite its 
politization, post-truth lacks a coherent understanding of whether it is a threat, that has to 
be counted, or just the current state of affairs in the social sphere. To accept post-truth as 
“normal” and natural for the modern world would be rather a mistake, with far-reaching 
consequences. But at the same time, the interpretation of post-truth as a thread leads to 
another common mistake, when it is perceived as an external danger that can be pre-
vented trough restrictions, control and other types of limitations. Thus, fencing out and 
labelling others for being “post-truth” leads to a simplistic and even distorted understand-
ing of the problem.
Thus, a creative reinterpretation of post-truth is needed. A way out can be found 
through the usage of the resilience theory. Resilience, yet another interdisciplinary con-
cept, helps to structure the differences between the external and internal character of a 
threat or challenge. Resilience becomes in particular important as it dominates the dis-
course of European politics in different spheres, including the countering of disinforma-
tion.
Initially, resilience came from environmental science, where C. S. Holling opposed it 
to the notion of stability. He described resilience as “the ability of <…> systems to absorb 
changes of state variables, driving variables, and parameters, and still persist” [16], whereby 
“resilience is the property of the system and persistence or probability of extinction is the 
result” [16, p. 17]. Another, a more social-oriented definition of resilience describes it as 
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“the capacity of a system to absorb disturbances and reorganize while undergoing change 
so as still retain essentially the same functions, structure, identity, and feedback”  [17]. 
Through its universal applicability resilience made its way into social sciences, psychol-
ogy, economics, crisis management, and different other spheres. Starting from the 1970-s 
resilience has gradually evolved and presented several visions on the systematic reaction 
towards disturbances and disasters. These visions are well reflected in two classifications, 
one proposed by David Chandler and Jon Coaffee, and the other by Philippe Bourbeau.
The ladder consists of three types of resilience: as Maintenance, Marginality, and Re-
newal [3]. All of them are based on systemic logic. The first, resilience as Maintenance “is 
characterised by adaptation in which resources and energy will be expended in maintain-
ing the status quo” [3, p. 29]. Here the disturbances will be problematized by the domi-
nant discourse, defining them as something “threatening and dangerous”. Resilience as 
Marginality moves further by “bringing changes to the margins but do not challenge the 
basis of a policy” [3, p. 29]. In this case, the discursive practices are producing marginal 
adjustments in the face of a problem, whereby the “problem” itself is in practice perceived 
as being less urgent. The third, resilience as Renewal “is characterized by responses that 
transform basic policy assumptions and, thus, potentially remodel social structure” [3, 
p. 29]. This is the most transformative type of resilience, that brings in new types of poli-
cies and governance.
The other classification focuses on different relations between conservatism and in-
teractivity. Chandler classifies resilience also in three categories articulating the homeo-
static, autopoietic and ad hoc approaches [4]. Homeostasis in this sense means once again 
the maintaining of the status quo, or the “bouncing back” by “returning to the pre-existing 
equilibrium” and focusing on the internal properties of a society or system. The autopoietic 
approach is perceived as the second generation of resilience, which aims at growth and 
development through the process of “self-regulating”. Thus, the most important charac-
teristic becomes the “ongoing self-transformation <…> linked to “bouncing forward” [4, 
p. 5]. The third approach is more subject-oriented by “developing resilience at the level of 
micro-politics or life-politics” [4, p. 6]. Resilience in this context builds up engaged com-
munities, where a problem is “reinterpreted as enabling and creating opportunities”.
Altogether resilience is a concept that extends our understanding of any social dy-
namics in the face of disturbances. Of big importance is also the linkage between the 
external and internal characteristics of a crisis or challenge. There is no strict division 
between them as they are interconnected. The binary understanding does not help the 
problem solution. The awareness of consequences and side-effects leads to an approach, 
where “problems are not always seen as something external” but illustrate “our own lack 
of understanding or failure to be alert to changes…” [4, p. 4].
Resilience concept in the European political discourse
The term “resilience” appeared in European politics in the 1980-s. As a concept itself, 
it has been integrated into a wider range of topics over the decades. Starting with envi-
ronmental policy, it has later appeared in the context of economic relations. Since 1990-s 
the notion has been used in external relations with third countries [18]. In the second 
decade of our century, the concept started to appear regularly in different documents and 
regulations. In 2012 it appeared in the context of EU s development policy concerning the 
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food crises in developing countries [18]. Thus, during a nearly four-decade-long evolution 
resilience has evolved in the European discourse spreading to topics related to the social, 
political and institutional dimensions.
It becomes even more obvious in the year 2016 when the European Union Global 
Strategy has been published. Here the term “resilience” has been used more than 40 times. 
In the Strategy, there is a strict connection between resilience and democracy noting, that 
a “resilient society featuring democracy, trust in institutions, and sustainable development 
lies at the heart of a resilient state” [19]. Still, there are contradictions in its usage, since 
the Global Strategy, using the word “resilience”, does not apply its theoretical assumptions. 
First of all, it securitizes a range of threats, with the focus on the threats themselves, and 
not on the internal resources of the system [18, p. 22]. Hybrid threats and disinforma-
tion are among those threats, placed in the context of external actions and the creation 
of strategic communications, that should be carried out by the EU to “offer rapid, factual 
rebuttals of disinformation”.
This concept of resilience towards disinformation can be also found in the EU’s 
2017 Joint communication “A Strategic Approach to Resilience in the EU’s external ac-
tion”. In this document, resilience is also presented as the aim of strategic communications 
mentioning, that “measures to increase citizens’ resilience to hostile disinformation will 
be further developed by raising awareness, by supporting greater media plurality and pro-
fessionalism, and by communicating positive narratives and fact-based messages” [20]. 
Altogether this understanding of disinformation has predetermined the anti-disinforma-
tion strategy of the EU in the run-up to the 2019 elections, forming the framework for 
further actions.
Disinformation and post-truth: External or internal threat?
The outlined willingness to counter disinformation during and beyond the European 
elections was the result of the aforementioned trend towards post-truth politics. The ex-
amples all around Europe brought to the necessity to withstand and fight against an ag-
gressive emotional environment. In the year 2016 the President of the European Council, 
Donald Tusk, twittered, that “post-factual reality and post-truth politics pose a great chal-
lenge on both sides of the Atlantic” [21]. The flood of such categories as fake news, strate-
gic communications, disinformation, propaganda, and misinformation into politics and 
media speech opened up the public debate to what can be perceived as a threat and how to 
counter it. In some countries the government undertook actions to block the promoters 
of misinforming type of content (Lithuania), others developed internal regulations (Ger-
many, France), whereby often all the post-truth related words became mixed up, without 
being properly used or categorized.
The major contradiction that appeared, as a result, is the question, whether all the 
false information, disseminated per social media, has an exogenous or endogenous nature 
(Table 1). The relevant points of view to this question speculate on the possible sources of 
fake news. From one perspective, the main reason for the proliferation of misinformative 
and emotions-appealing content is the internal threat of populism. The populistic dis-
course fosters the creation of affective statements or content, thus enabling the populistic 
political groups to gain bigger influence. Jean-Claude Juncker, the President of the Euro-
pean Commission, expressed before the European elections the fear of internal fake news 
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proliferation. In April 2019 he claimed: “I can see an attempt to rig the European Parlia-
ment elections. This comes from several quarters, and not only from outside the EU. States 
within the EU are also seeking to direct the will of voters in a particular direction with fake 
news” [22]. A similar message was delivered by Ramón Luis Valcárcel Siso, the European 
Parliament’s ex-Vice president, who stressed the necessity to ensure, that “anti-democrats 
don’t win at the ballot boxes” because of the “division sowed by populists and nationalists, 
through a discourse of hatred, lies and half-truths and proven falsehoods” [23].
The other perspective is the opposite one, focusing on the external characteristic of 
false information (disinformation). This point of view was conceptualized in the European 
Parliament resolution of 23 November 2016 on “EU strategic communication to counteract 
propaganda against it by third parties”. Here the main source of fake news is perceived to 
be Russia, thus, externalizing the threat of fake news and disinformation. In a statement 
on the Action plan to counter disinformation Andrus Ansip, the ex-Vice-President of the 
European Commission and the ex-European Commissioner for the Digital Single Market, 
highlighted, that “there is strong evidence pointing to Russia as a primary source of disinfor-
mation in Europe” [24], considering that “disinformation is part of Russia’s military doctrine 
and its strategy to divide and weaken the West” [24]. The same attitude can be noted in the 
statements of Federica Mogherini, High Representative of the European Union for Foreign 
Affairs and Security Policy. At the press conference following the Foreign Affairs Council in 
2018, she stressed “a challenging Russian behaviour in many different fields” [25], highlight-
ing that the “areas of challenging Russian behaviour include <…> activities of disinforma-
tion, internal interference, hybrid threats, malicious cyber activities…” [25].
Table 1. Positions on the nature of false information in the European discourse (made by the author)
Endogenous threat Exogenous threat
“I can see an attempt to rig the European Parliament 
elections. This comes from several quarters, and not 
only from outside the EU. States within the EU are 
also seeking to direct the will of voters in a particular 
direction with fake news” (Jean-Claude Juncker)
“There is strong evidence pointing to Russia as 
a primary source of disinformation in Europe”, 
“Disinformation is part of Russia’s military doctrine 
and its strategy to divide and weaken the West” 
(Andrus Ansip)
“Anti-democrats don’t win at the ballot boxes”, 
“Division sowed by populists and nationalists, 
through a discourse of hatred, lies and half-truths 
and proven falsehoods” (Ramón Luis Valcárcel Siso)
“A challenging Russian behaviour in many different 
fields”, “Areas of challenging Russian behaviour 
include… activities of disinformation, internal 
interference, hybrid threats, malicious cyber 
activities…” (Federica Mogherini)
Altogether this duality in regard to the threat of fake news is currently leaned to-
wards the second approach. This will be described further on and can be very well traced 
in the Action Plan against Disinformation [26]. Despite the social consensus about the 
possible danger of fake news produced by different radical political groups inside the EU, 
the main attention is dragged towards the external aspect of a post-truth environment. In 
this regard, the term post-truth itself becomes meanwhile part of the academic apparatus 
thereby disappearing from political discourse. But this disproportion in the perception of 
the external and internal aspect of the post-truth phenomena brings in a distorted under-
standing of how to develop social resilience towards it.
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The contemporary information environment, that can be characterized as open, in 
states with a liberal and open democratic regime does not allow to separate the external 
and internal character of the content inside the internet, and the social networks. Thereby, 
the main distributor of content often provides the advertising mechanisms and algorithms 
to all interested and involved parties. The decentralized nature of information prolifera-
tion, in contrast to the traditional media, involves the originally exogenous content into a 
common system, thus making a potential danger into a part the internal environment, not 
allowing the system to isolate itself. In terms of resilience theory, this means a shift from 
“defense” against external danger, towards “resilience” as a category of self-adaptation to 
it [27]. Despite its commitment towards the category of resilience, the EU has failed so 
far to identify the twofold nature of post-truth influencing the European society. The dis-
tinction between fake news from populists and disinformation from without during the 
counteraction is ineffective, because, by only focusing on one aspect of the emotional 
information sphere, the omission of the second leads to an incomplete adaptation or solu-
tion of a problem. This distinction between the external and internal can be even better 
understood through the analysis of gradual change in the key categories of post-truth 
prevention in the EU. 
Strategic communication, fake news, disinformation
Even with the acceptance of fake news as a threat to European society, there is still a 
difficulty to understand what this type of false information is. In the academic discourse, 
there is a broad variety of interpretations ranging from a multifaceted nature of fake news 
[28], to the complete denial of the appropriates of such a category in general [29]. Fake 
news can thus include a big variety of phenomena, including disinformation, different 
types of misinformation, parody and falsehoods [28].
The European Union itself gradually developed its understanding of the nature of fake 
news. At the very start of the Ukrainian crisis the major category used by EU officials was 
propaganda or strategic communications. The European Parliament resolution “On EU 
strategic communication to counteract propaganda against it by third parties” once again 
constitutionalized this development [30]. Further on, in the year 2016, after the promotion 
and popularisation of the words post-truth the central category became the identification 
of false information in form of fake news, which has the aim to destabilize electoral cam-
paigns. This has coincided with the early steps of “fake news prevention” in the EU [31]. But 
early in the year 2018, another shift in the vocabulary of the EU documents has happened. 
The notion “fake news” becomes replaced by “disinformation”. The reason was a Report of 
the High-Level Expert Group on fake news and disinformation [29]. In general, there were 
two reasons why the EU has moved away from the term “fake news”. First of all, it has been 
blamed to be very politicized. The second reason was that it is very conditional and unclear 
by nature. Thus, disinformation becomes the main concept and term in every new docu-
ment and strategy on the countering of the threat of false information.
As a result, three different terms appear in the public discourse and official docu-
ments of the EU. The shift towards the notion of disinformation illustrates once again the 
externalization of the threat. A strong connection to the information warfare and Russia 
separates the current actions from the internal aspect. At the same time “disinformation” 
as a word, that has been used throughout the Cold war does not reflect the specificity of 
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the issue the EU is facing. As a result, such mechanisms as targeting, information foods, 
and filter bubbles are not implicit to the notion of disinformation. 
Still, this pluralism of terms can be seen during the whole pre-election period in the 
EU. The whole debate on free and fair elections was dominated by the understanding of 
a necessity to counter the misinformative impact on the elections. And to illustrate the 
different approaches towards fake news prevention once again resilience theory should 
be applied. Despite some difficulties in the application of resilience theory to post-truth 
in the case of EU, it still can give us a better understanding of the different strategies to 
counter disinformation.
European Parliament elections 
and post-truth/disinformation prevention
Through the lens of resilience, disinformation can be interpreted as a system-disturb-
ing factor. Its impact on the curtail aspects of information infrastructure drives us to its 
inclusion into the system as a disturbance, that needs an adaptation mechanism inside the 
system. Overall, in the EU practice, two ways to project and create this adaptation can be 
found. Both were developed during the period 2015–2018. On its final stage (2018–2019) 
the focus was to prepare the European society to the influence of disinformation during 
the 2019 Elections. One of the elaborated approaches can be referred to as “paternalistic”, 
including different forms of protective interventions into the public sphere to prevent the 
dissemination of false information. The other approach can be described as “adaptive” and 
refers to a liberal kind of thinking, stressing the importance of freedom of speech and is 
closely related to adaptivity itself.
Originally, the first approach, that emerged in the EU was the paternalistic one. It 
tended to introduce the bouncing back (homeostatic approach towards resilience) to the 
previous condition of the system, thereby focusing on the internal resources of the society, 
externalizing the threat [4]. The main forms of counteracting are restrictions, normative 
regulations, institutional involvement [32; 33] and even the imposition of counterpropa-
ganda [34].
Initially, this approach could be associated with the actions of the European Parlia-
ment and the European External Action Service. The establishment of the East StratCom 
Task Force, an institution of strategic counter-narrative proliferation, in 2015 can be seen 
as the first initiative in this direction. Than the EP Resolution of 2016 followed up, under-
lining “the crucial need to ensure resilience of the information systems at EU and Member 
State level” [30] and calling the European Commission “to advance certain legal initiatives 
in order to be more effective and accountable in dealing with disinformation and propa-
ganda and to use the midterm review of the European Neighbourhood Instrument to 
promote the strengthening of the resilience of the media as a strategic priority” [30]. The 
appeal to legal initiatives reveals once again the paternalistic nature of this kind of threat 
prevention. A further step in this direction can be found in the European Parliament reso-
lution of 15 June 2017 on online platforms and the digital single market, where the EP 
“Calls on the Commission to analyze in-depth the current situation and legal framework 
with regard to fake news, and to verify the possibility of legislative intervention to limit the 
dissemination and spreading of fake content” [35]. All these examples tend to recreate the 
conditions before the impact by limiting the danger.
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An alternative adaptive approach emerged consequently throughout the evolution 
of disinformation prevention. It is closely related to the autopoietic or self-regulating ap-
proach, to bounce forward through the evolution of the social system on the next stage 
of resilience to the danger [4]. Thus, this approach focuses not on the responding to the 
danger, but on the development of mechanisms to contain the influence through the adap-
tation to a threat, therefore bringing the society on a qualitatively new level of coexistence 
with the threat. This way of thinking has been promoted by the European Commission 
since the beginning of 2018. 
The key documents elaborated by the Commission are the Action Plan against Dis-
information (JOIN(2018) 36 final), Communication — Tackling online disinformation: a 
European Approach (COM/2018/236 final) and the Final Report of the High-Level Expert 
Group on Fake News and Online Disinformation. The Final report of the HLEG was the 
result of public consolations and it proposed a multidimensional approach towards disin-
formation. This multidimensionality included the increasing openness of media, fostering 
of media-literacy, the widening of users’ involvement in the process of fake news prevention, 
and further researches [30]. An important point is that the measures proposed in this report 
aim “instead to provide short-term responses to the most pressing problems, longer-term re-
sponses to increase societal resilience to disinformation, and a framework for ensuring that 
the effectiveness of these responses is continuously evaluated, while new evidence-based 
responses are developed” [29]. This idea was carried out further on in the “Tackling online 
disinformation” Communication, which manly overlap with such principles promoted by 
the HLEG report as openness, development, trust, and inclusiveness. For the first time, the 
Communication puts forward the aim to promote a “secure and resilient election processes” 
with a direct connection to the 2019 European Parliament elections [36]. The adaptive logic 
of the Communication brought also to the creation of a Code of Practice on Disinforma-
tion, which is a self-regulatory standard to fight disinformation agreed by representatives of 
online platforms, leading social networks, advertisers and advertising industry [37]. 
The latest adapted document on disinformation is the Action Plan against Disinforma-
tion, which represents the current strategy of the Commission. It represents the essence of 
the adaptive logic, by including all the gathered experience. “The coordinated response to 
disinformation presented in this Action Plan is based on four pillars: (i) improving the capa-
bilities of Union institutions to detect, analyse and expose disinformation; (ii) strengthening 
coordinated and joint responses to disinformation; (iii) mobilising private sector to tackle 
disinformation; (iv) raising awareness and improving societal resilience” [26]. The Action 
plan was also set up as an instrument to secure the European Parliament elections from be-
ing influenced by disinformation. All of the four pillars stressed the need not to constrain the 
dissemination of disinformation, but to expose it, making the society resilient to the threat 
itself. Awareness, thus, is the key to an adaptive environment.
Both aforementioned strategies (Table 2)  represent the current state of affairs 
in the EU’s understanding of post-truth prevention. Despite its focus on its external 
characteristics (e. g. disinformation), the shift to an adaptive logic provides a more resilient 
way of dealing with its consequences by strengthening the societies ability to cope with the 
threat. But still, the externalization and securitization of disinformation as an exogenous 
threat brings in a distorted view on the post-truth environment.
However, a brief overview of the results of the 2019 elections shows that the strategy 
chosen by the EU gave a moderate result. Following the Report on the implementation of 
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the Action Plan Against Disinformation, there were no major attempts of disinformation 
detected, and the populist parties haven’t gained a spectacular result [38]. What is 
nevertheless important is that the rise of public averseness has led to one of the best 
participation rates for several decades. But yet the threat of disinformation and fake news 
is still there, and the EU will surely preserve its course on developing social resilience to it.
Conclusion
This research aimed to provide an insight into the European understanding of the 
post-truth phenomena and the different approaches of how to handle it. Thus, it has 
focused on the pre-election period and does not give a detailed analysis of the results 
themselves. The examination of the practical and discursive aspect of the EU’s actions and 
perception towards disinformation showed that there is a difference in the understanding 
of how post-truth influences the EU. The duality of perception, what the nature of false 
information (disinformation) can be, is present in the EU discourse. But the dominant 
point of view, that the disinformation has an external source, has predetermined the 
actions undertaken by the EU before the Parliament elections. 
The need to establish a resilient environment towards disinformation led to the 
establishment of two major strategies: the adaptive and paternalistic approach. But 
the externalization of the problem has created a major difficulty in the development of 
social resilience towards post-truth. The exclusion of the fake news and disinformation 
produced by internal actors in the discourse leads to a distorted picture of the post-truth 
environment and the current state of affairs in general. At the same time, in practice, the 
externalization has low influence in the adaptive approach, because it does not separate 
Table 2. EU’s approaches to counter disinformation (post-truth) (made by the author)
Paternalistic (homeostatic) approach 
bouncing back
Adaptive (autopoietic) approach 
bounce forward
Main forms of counteracting disinformation: re-
strictions, normative regulations, institutional 
involvement, imposition of counterpropaganda 
(counternarrative)
Main forms of counteracting disinformation: 
openness of media, fostering of media-literacy, the 
widening of users’ involvement into the process of 
fake news prevention, further researches, self-regu-
latory standards (mobilizing private sector), raising 
awareness 
European External Action Service,
European Parliament (2016–2017)
European Commission, 
European Parliament (2018 — now) 
East StratCom Task Force;
European Parliament resolution of 23  Novem-
ber 2016  on EU strategic communication to 
counteract propaganda against it by third parties 
(2016/2030(INI));
European Parliament resolution of 15 June 2017 on 
online platforms and the digital single market/
Action Plan against Disinformation (JOIN(2018) 
36 final);
Communication — Tackling online disinformation: 
a European Approach (COM/2018/236 final);
Final report of the High Level Expert Group on Fake 
News and Online Disinformation;
Code of Practice;
European Parliament resolution of 3 May 2018 on 
media pluralism and media freedom in the 
European Union (2017/2209(INI))/
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the threat from the society itself, thereby focusing on further transformations and the 
capabilities of a society. But, if the paternalistic approach is still applied (and there is a lot 
of cases of paternalism in national politics) to counter disinformation, it focuses only on 
one source from many, simplifying the threat itself, or even creating a counter-narrative, 
that tends to become itself an irrational distortion of reality.
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